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1371 
RAZOR SLASHED PRICES: THE 
APPLICABILITY OF PATENT EXHAUSTION 
TO SALES FOR BELOW COST 
DANIEL HUTTLE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Around the time of their eighteenth birthday, many young 
adults are hoping to receive a car to use for the remainder of high 
school into college or their careers.  However, young men often 
receive an unsolicited surprise gift of a new Gillette razor in the 
mail around this time.  While the benefit of a free razor to the 
recipient is obvious, the direct benefit to the manufacturer is less 
so.  Besides the value as a marketing tool, the company can use 
this promotion as a way to not only recoup the costs of the freely 
given razor, but also profit in the long-term.  This can be 
achieved in the medium to long-term through the sale of the 
compatible blade cartridges at a much higher price than they cost 
to produce. 
This strategy of selling goods or services is known as the 
“metered” pricing model.1  This is also referred to as the “Razors-
and-Blades” model which is sometimes incorrectly attributed to 
King C. Gillette.2  The concept is that by selling an initial good or 
service for a very low price, the universe of customers willing to 
purchase the product increases.3  Any losses incurred from the  
 
 
† Associate Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2016, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.S., Computer Science, magna cum laude, 2010, 
St. John’s University. I would like to thank Professor Jeremy Sheff for his 
invaluable help and guidance with this Note. 
1 Ricard Gil & Wesley R. Hartmann, Empirical Analysis of Metering Price 
Discrimination: Evidence from Concession Sales at Movie Theaters, 28 MARKETING 
SCI. 1046, 1046 (2009). 
2 Randal C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s), 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 227 
(2011) (“The first [myth] is that Gillette invented razors-and-blades and gave away 
or sold low-priced handles to sell high-priced blades.”). 
3 See Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1. 
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first transaction can be overcome by selling goods or services 
needed by the initial product for a much higher price than they 
cost to produce.4 
In the original example, Gillette loses money on production 
and shipping of the razor for free in the hope that the recipient 
becomes a customer for blades—sold for much higher than the 
cost to produce—in order to continue using the device.  This is a 
viable strategy assuming that Gillette has a patent on both the 
razor and the blades, as no one will be able to compete in the 
blade market for the duration of that patent.  However, suppose 
the blade is not patented, or the patent was later invalidated.  In 
that situation, absent some other patent protection, competition 
in the market for blades would drive prices down to the cost of 
production.  This would prevent Gillette from recouping its costs 
under this model, making it an economically unsound course of 
action. 
In LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC,5 the 
Federal Circuit heard, in a matter of first impression, whether a 
patentee should retain rights to control the use of a good 
distributed for free in a manner similar to the Gillette example.6  
The suit involved a method patent7 to test blood glucose levels for 
diabetics.8  LifeScan manufactures a product utilizing this 
method called the “OneTouch Ultra” blood glucose meter.9  In 
marketing these meters, forty percent are sold for below cost and 
sixty percent are distributed for free.10  The goal of this strategy 
is to later profit from the sale of compatible test strips, which are 
required to use the meter.11  Shasta manufactures a test strip 
designed to work in the LifeScan meter, which led LifeScan to 
file a civil suit.12  LifeScan claimed that Shasta committed 
4 Picker, supra note 2, at 226. 
5 734 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
6 Id. at 1374. 
7 A method patent, also called a process patent, protects “an operation or series 
of steps leading to a useful result.” DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03 
(Matthew Bender 2015). The other broad category of utility patents is for specific 
tangible products including machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. Id. 
§ 1.02. 
8 LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1363–64. 
9 Id. at 1364. 
10 Id. at 1365. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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contributory infringement13 by selling test strips designed to 
work with its meters, which embodied their patented method of 
testing blood glucose.14 
Despite the lack of profit made on sales of the meters, the 
Federal Circuit held that the policy of patent exhaustion applies 
in circumstances where products are given away for free or sold 
below cost.15  Patent exhaustion is a common law doctrine which 
has historically stated that once a patentee has sold a patented 
good for its full value, he loses the ability to control the use and 
sale of that particular article on patent grounds.16  The concept of 
the doctrine being applied to goods distributed for free—rather 
than being sold—is a matter of first impression for the Federal 
Circuit.17  The court expanded the doctrine to cover all transfers 
of title, not just sales to purchasers for the full value of the 
patented article.18  This holding is binding precedent in all 
United States District Courts because, unlike most areas of law, 
the Federal Circuit is designated by statute as the sole court of 
appeals for patent cases.19 
This Note addresses whether this expansion of patent 
exhaustion is necessary or justified.  Part I provides a 
background on the relevant doctrines and concepts implicated by 
the LifeScan decision.  This Part begins with a discussion on the 
history and development of the patent exhaustion doctrine under 
the common law.  This Part also introduces the antitrust concept 
of tying and how it relates to patent misuse.  Part II considers 
whether patent exhaustion should be applied to both goods 
distributed for no cost and goods sold below the cost to produce.  
Part III analyzes the anticompetitive potential of refusing to 
extend patent exhaustion in both of these situations, and 
discusses the application of the doctrine of patent misuse in  
 
13 “The seller is liable as a contributory infringer if he knows that the 
component is ‘especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of 
such patent’ and if the component is ‘not a staple article or commodity of commerce 
suitable for substantial noninfringing use.’ ” CHISUM, supra note 7, § 17.01. 
14 LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1365. 
15 Id. at 1377. 
16 See infra Part I.A. 
17 LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1374. 
18 Id. at 1377. 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). Patent cases may only be initiated in United 
States District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012). 
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such circumstances.  Finally, Part IV analyzes a hypothetical 
situation where the concerns created by the expansion of patent 
exhaustion are put into sharper focus. 
The Note concludes that the Federal Circuit’s extension of 
patent exhaustion is not consistent with United States Supreme 
Court jurisprudence on the matter.  Further, this refocus on 
transfers of title instead of sales for fair value causes problems to 
the metered pricing model, which may lead to unintended harms 
to both consumers and manufacturers of patented goods.  Finally, 
this Note argues that any anticompetitive results that might 
arise from a failure to expand patent exhaustion in such a way 
are mitigated by the existing doctrine of patent misuse.  To 
begin, the evolution of both patent exhaustion and patent misuse 
must be discussed. 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE RELEVANT DOCTRINES AND CONCEPTS 
A. The Common Law Development of Patent Exhaustion 
Generally speaking, obtaining a patent for an invention 
“confers the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling 
the claimed invention in the United States for a term 
of . . . years.”20  A patentee may bring a lawsuit against anyone 
who either directly or indirectly infringes upon any of these 
rights under the patent.21 
Under the common law doctrine of patent exhaustion, often 
referred to as “first sale” doctrine, once a patentee has sold a 
patented good he has exhausted his ability to control the use, 
resale, or repair of the particular article.22  There are two general 
public policies that justify limiting the general principle of patent 
law in this way.  First is the common law’s strong stance against 
barriers to the free alienation of property.23  Second is the risk 
that placing such conditions on trade may implicate antitrust 
concerns.24  Since a patent infringement action can be sought 
against anyone who knowingly contributes to the infringement of 
20 CHISUM, supra note 7, § OV.1. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. § 16.03(2)(a). 
23 Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First 
Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 493 (2011); see also 
Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhausting Doctrine, 
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 492 (2010). 
24 Rinehart, supra note 23. 
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others—with no limitation from privity of contract—there can be 
serious anticompetitive consequences if there were no such 
restriction available.25 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bloomer v. McQuewan26 is 
generally regarded as the origin of the patent exhaustion 
doctrine.27  Chief Justice Taney framed the rights given by the 
patent for a planing machine as a monopoly by the patentee, who 
could share a portion of such monopoly with his licensees.28  The 
Court held that a distinction exists between a licensee and one 
who purchases a good whose only value is in its use from the 
patentee in a lawful sale.29  Once such a sale occurs, the patented 
article “passes outside of [the monopoly], and is no longer under 
the protection of the act of Congress.”30 
The Supreme Court refined the concept two decades later in 
Adams v. Burke.31  This case dealt with a patent for coffin lids 
where the patentee gave his licensee the right to manufacture, 
use, and sell these lids in a limited geographic area.32  The 
question presented to the Court was whether a purchaser who 
had bought such a lid from the licensee within his region had the 
right to use the lid in a burial outside of that region.33  The Court 
held that even though the assignee had a limitation on the region 
in which he was authorized to sell the lids, a purchaser of a 
patented good whose sole function is its use has the right to use 
the good regardless of any restrictions on an assignee.34  The 
patentee no longer has the right to restrict the use of the good 
when he has “in the act of sale received all the royalty or 
consideration” for that good.35 
Both Bloomer and Adams were further interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.36  There, 
the patentee assigned the right to sell his patented folding beds 
25 See Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 492. 
26 55 U.S. 539 (1852). 
27 Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale Restrictions on 
Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 564 (2013). 
28 Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 549. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
32 Id. at 456. 
33 See id. at 457. 
34 Id. at 456–57. 
35 Id. at 456. 
36 157 U.S. 659 (1895). 
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within Michigan to an assignee.37  This assignee sold to 
defendants a carload of the patented beds, which defendants 
later took to Massachusetts to resell for their own profit.38  In 
reversing the decisions of the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
held that a purchaser who purchases patented goods from 
someone authorized to sell such goods gains an “absolute 
property” right in the goods purchased, “unrestricted in time or 
place.”39  This included freedom from restrictions on both use and 
sale.40  The Court also explicitly stated that the patentee’s rights 
are not deprived “because no article can be unfettered from the 
claim of his monopoly without paying its tribute.”41 
This justification for the limitation on the patentee’s rights 
continued into the twentieth century.  In United States v. Univis 
Lens Co.,42 the purpose of the limited monopoly granted by patent 
law was said to enable the inventor “to secure the financial 
rewards for his invention.”43  The Court held that “the purpose of 
the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article 
when the patentee has received his reward for the use of his 
invention by the sale of the article.”  Therefore, there is no patent 
law basis for further restraining the use of that particular 
article.44  Even in its most recent case on exhaustion, the 
Supreme Court still framed the discussion in terms of sale.45  The 
Federal Circuit, save its decision in LifeScan, has also 
consistently framed its discussions on exhaustion in this way.46 
37 Standard Folding Bed Co. v. Keeler, 37 F. 693, 693–94 (C.C.D. Mass. 1889), 
rev’d, 157 U.S. 659 (1895). 
38 Id. at 694. 
39 Keeler, 157 U.S. at 666. 
40 Id. at 664. 
41 Id. at 666–67. 
42 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
43 Id. at 250. 
44 Id. at 251. 
45 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008) (“The 
authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the 
patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking patent law to 
control postsale use of the article.”). 
46 See, e.g., B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (“The theory behind [patent exhaustion] is that in such a transaction, the 
patentee has bargained for, and received, an amount equal to the full value of the 
goods.”). 
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B. Patent Misuse in the Context of Antitrust Tying 
Patent misuse47 arose under common law as a defense to 
patent infringement when the patentee engaged in conduct 
which constitutes “misuse” of the patent.48  To succeed on this 
defense, the patentee must have “impermissibly broadened the 
‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect.”49 
The doctrine of patent misuse was first adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co.50  This case involved a patented motion 
picture projector which came affixed with a notice limiting its use 
to only films which were authorized by the patent holder.51  The 
Supreme Court struck down this restriction as invalid because 
the film itself was not part of the patented invention of the 
projector.52  In the eyes of the Court, to not strike down such a 
provision would give “such a potential power for evil” that would 
be “gravely injurious” to the public interest.53  To broaden the 
patent right in such a way would be an unacceptable result, 
completely outside “the scope and purpose of our patent laws.”54 
The restriction imposed in Motion Picture Patents Co. is an 
example of a “tying” arrangement.  Tying is a term of art in 
antitrust law describing an agreement to sell one product—the 
tying product—on the condition that the purchaser also buys a 
different product—the tied product.55  Until a 1988 amendment 
to the patent infringement statute, the act of tying a patented 
good to the sale of an unpatented staple product constituted per 
se patent misuse.56  “[A] staple article is one that has substantial 
non-infringing uses.  A non-staple article is one which is specially 
47 For the purposes of this Note, the discussion of patent misuse is limited to its 
application to the antitrust concept of tying. Patent misuse is a broad concept which 
applies to many other types of activities which are not relevant to the discussion 
here. 
48 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 19.04. 
49 Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)). 
50 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
51 Id. at 505–06. 
52 Id. at 518. 
53 Id. at 519. 
54 Id. 
55 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958). 
56 Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: “Blessed Be the 
Tie?,” 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1–2 (1991). 
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made or adapted for use in infringement of a patent and which 
has no substantial non-infringing uses.”57  The rationale behind 
the judicially created per se rule against tying was grounded in 
an attempt to restrict patentees from using their rights to gain 
an unfair advantage in the marketplace of goods beyond the 
scope of the patent.58 
The Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 added, in relevant 
part: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right 
by reason of his having . . . conditioned the license of any rights 
to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the 
acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase 
of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the 
patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the 
patent or patented product on which the license or sale is 
conditioned.59 
This action by Congress limited the original rule against tying to 
only apply if the patentee has “market power” in the market of 
the tying product.60  When determining the existence of market 
power, the existence of the patent is relevant to the analysis but 
is generally not in itself sufficient to presume that market power 
exists.61  “Market power is determined by whether the seller has 
the power ‘to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms 
such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of 
buyers within the market.’ ”62 
Another area where tying arrangements have historically 
constituted patent misuse is in the context of contributory 
infringement actions.63  This situation often arises when a third 
party manufactures component parts designed specifically for use 
in a patented device or machine.64  The specific design of these 
57 THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASICS § 11.02 (2015). 
58 C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
59 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012). 
60 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.3a1 (CCH Inc., 2014). 
61 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.2 (CCH Inc., 2010). 
62 Burchfiel, supra note 56, at 28 (quoting Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969)). 
63 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2. 
64 Id. 
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parts to work with the patented machine, as opposed to a part 
common to an entire class of devices, makes the part a nonstaple 
good.65  The Supreme Court has held that a patentee misused his 
patent by attempting to control third-party sales of component 
parts, even nonstaple goods, for use in the patented device.66 
Additions made in the 1952 Patent Act67 served to reverse 
these decisions and restrict the boundaries of patent misuse.68  
This amendment allows a patentee “to require its licensees to 
purchase non-staple goods only from it, and to sue makers of 
those non-staple goods for contributory infringement, without 
liability for misuse.”69  Further, the patentee is permitted to 
enforce his rights against contributory infringers without concern 
that such an action would be a misuse of his patent right.70 
With this introduction to the long histories of both patent 
exhaustion and patent misuse, the applicability of these 
doctrines to the LifeScan case can now be discussed.  First, the 
Federal Circuit’s holding that patent exhaustion applies to all 
transfers of title needs to be examined. 
II. PATENT EXHAUSTION SHOULD NOT APPLY TO GOODS SOLD 
BELOW COST 
There are two major concerns arising from the Federal 
Circuit holding that goods distributed for free or sold below cost 
are subject to patent exhaustion as authorized transfers of title.71  
First, this expansion of patent exhaustion doctrine is not 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the 
doctrine.72  Second, such a harsh rule may present unanticipated 
negative effects on both consumers and patentees.73  These two 
issues demonstrate that such an expansion might not be a  
 
65 Id. 
66 Id.; see also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); 
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). 
67 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)–(3) (2012). 
68 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2. 
69 Id.; see also Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 201 (1980) 
(rejecting a patent misuse defense for a third-party seller of an unpatented, 
nonstaple chemical whose sole use is in the patentee’s method for treating weeds). 
70 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012). 
71 LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
72 See infra Part II.A. 
73 See infra Part II.B. 
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prudent course to take, especially in light of the availability of 
existing patent misuse doctrine to prevent anticompetitive acts 
that may result from failing to expand patent exhaustion.74 
A. The Federal Circuit’s Expansion of Patent Exhaustion Is Not 
Consistent with the Prior Precedent of the Supreme Court 
When discussing transactions that trigger an exhaustion of a 
patentee’s rights, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have 
consistently framed the requirements as an authorized sale to a 
purchaser for fair value or consideration.75  The Federal Circuit’s 
decision in LifeScan adds two additional categories of 
transactions to the definition: goods distributed for free and 
goods sold for below the cost of production.76  To expand the scope 
of exhaustive transactions to anyone in which title is transferred 
redefines the entire concept of such a transaction.  While the 
category of goods distributed for free has a stronger argument 
that patent exhaustion should not apply, both categories 
ultimately lack consistency with the historical development of 
the doctrine.77 
The first requirement to trigger exhaustion of the patent 
right—that a “sale”78 occurs—is not met for goods distributed for 
free.  This requirement is so fundamental to a qualifying 
transaction that patent exhaustion is also known as the doctrine 
of “first sale.”79  By plain meaning of the word sale, one does not 
consider a freely given good to have been sold.  This is true even 
by the legal definition of the word, meaning “[t]he transfer of 
property or title for a price.”80 
It is possible that the reason the Supreme Court used the 
term “sale” is that the Court never had the opportunity to hear a 
patent exhaustion dispute regarding transfers of title in a 
74 See infra Part III. 
75 See supra Part I.A. 
76 Freely distributed meters constituted sixty percent of all transfers of title in 
that case, while the remaining forty percent were sold below the cost to produce. 
Both categories of transaction were held to exhaust the patentee’s rights. LifeScan, 
734 F.3d at 1365, 1377. 
77 It was for this reason that the true focus of analysis for the Federal Circuit in 
LifeScan was on the freely distributed meters. 
78 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625, (2008); 
United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 
453, 456 (1873). 
79 CHISUM, supra note 7, § 16.03(2)(a). 
80 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (10th ed. 2014) (definition of “sale”). 
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patented article without cost.  While that may explain why the 
Court has not expanded the definition of patent exhaustion, it 
does not change the fact that the Court’s 150 years of 
jurisprudence on the matter has consistently required a sale to 
occur.  This means that any decision that alters that definition by 
a lower court—even one with so unique a position as the Federal 
Circuit81—should be heavily scrutinized. 
A similar result is reached when discussing the second 
requirement, that the recipient be a “purchaser.”82  Under the 
same plain meaning consideration, it is not common usage to 
refer to the recipient of a free good as a purchaser.  The legal 
definition agrees, describing a purchaser as “[s]omeone who 
obtains property for money or other valuable consideration; a 
buyer.”83  In light of both plain meaning and the legal definition, 
it is difficult to justify calling the recipient of a freely distributed 
good a purchaser.  Once again, the Supreme Court would be in 
the best position to decide whether to extend its standard for 
exhaustive transactions to not require a purchaser. 
In contrast to goods distributed for free, the concepts of sale 
and purchaser do fit a transaction where the good was sold for 
below cost.  Such an exchange involves a vendor that sells the 
good for a price in money, despite that price being less than the 
cost the vendor incurred to produce that good.  By paying a price 
in money for the property, the recipient is also within the 
definition of a purchaser.  However, in both freely distributed 
and below cost transactions, the third requirement is 
problematic. 
Unlike “sale” and “purchaser,” the third requirement for an 
exhaustive transaction is less clearly defined than the other two.  
The Supreme Court has referred to this in earlier cases as when 
“the patentee . . . received all the royalty or consideration”84 or “a 
valuable consideration.”85  The Federal Circuit itself has 
interpreted this as meaning “the patentee has bargained for, and 
81 The Federal Circuit is the sole court of appeals for patent cases arising from 
any United States District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
82 See, e.g., Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895); 
Adams, 84 U.S. at 456; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). 
83 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (10th ed. 2014) (definition of “purchaser”). 
84 Adams, 84 U.S. at 456.  
85 Keeler, 157 U.S. at 661. 
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received, an amount equal to the full value of the goods.”86  The 
rationale for this requirement is that patent exhaustion limits 
the right of the patentee to control a sold patented article 
because the patentee has received his reward under patent law 
for the article sold.87 
To hone in on what full value means in light of this 
rationale, it is important to consider the overarching goals of 
intellectual property law and patent law.  The predominant 
theory justifying intellectual property protection is utilitarian in 
nature.88  In the open market, the only reason an inventor would 
invest the time and money necessary to develop a new invention 
is if the profits to be made exceed those initial costs.89  However, 
once the idea behind the invention is discovered, competition will 
drive costs down to their marginal cost, preventing the inventor 
from recouping the costs of developing the invention.90  
Intellectual property law lessens this outcome, encouraging 
others to invent new products by giving them the tools to prevent 
others from copying them, which increases the chances of both 
recouping costs and profiting on the initial investment.91  Since 
increasing the likelihood of an inventor recouping research and 
development time as well as eventually profiting are the aims of 
the system of intellectual property laws, patent exhaustion 
doctrine should be consistent with those goals. 
The next step is to see if application of patent exhaustion 
when a good is sold below cost sacrifices this goal on individual 
articles in order to promote the free alienation of property.  To 
determine if this “full value” of the goods has been received by 
the patentee, two timeframes need to be examined.  First, the 
value received at the time of the transaction must be determined.  
In addition to that, any value that may be acquired 
posttransaction as a result of the transaction must also be 
considered. 
 
86 B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426. 
87 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942). 
88 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (6th ed. 2012). 
89 Id. at 12. 
90 Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and 
Market Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 841 (2007). 
91 Id. 
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At the time of the transaction—whether it concerns a good 
distributed for free or one sold for below cost—it cannot be said 
that the full value of the article has been received absent some 
consideration of future profits.  If the article was distributed for 
free, no monetary value was gained at the time of transaction.  
This cannot be said to have granted the full value of the article 
without going into needlessly subjective analysis over the good 
feelings received by the patentee.92  The same can be said for the 
value if the good is sold for below cost.  If the price paid for the 
article is less than its cost to produce it, for each transaction the 
patentee would be losing the difference between the two prices.  
If, at least at the time of transaction, each sale causes the 
patentee to lose more and more money, the goal of increasing 
likelihood of profitability can hardly be said to have been met at 
this point.93 
If the full value of the patented article has not been received 
at the time of the transaction, there must be some 
posttransaction reward that justifies applying patent exhaustion.  
Looking to the introductory example of giving away razors to 
make profit on the blades, that would constitute such a scenario 
in theory, as the blades are sold at a higher profit margin than 
the razors.  However, there is a potential problem with this 
method in practice.  Assuming a competitor enters the market for 
the profitable blades, the price of the blades would be reduced via 
competition towards the marginal cost to produce them, which 
would destroy the ability of the seller to both recoup his 
investment and eventually profit.94  This would lead the seller to 
default back to selling the initial good at a much higher price 
instead, which, as discussed later in this Note, causes potential 
problems for both the seller and prospective buyers.95 
 
 
 
92 Cf. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (holding that under contract law, a 
promise to a close family member that would make the promisor feel better does not 
constitute consideration). 
93 Katz, supra note 90. 
94 See id. 
95 See infra Part II.B. 
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To prevent this outcome, the seller would need some way to 
block competitors out of the market.96  If both the razor and the 
blades were patented, the patentee would be able to use his right 
to exclude others from selling the patented good to prevent the 
competitor from entering the market for the term of the patent.97  
However, the situation changes if only the original, below-cost 
good is patented, while the profitable good is not.  These were the 
circumstances surrounding LifeScan, where the blood glucose 
meter was found to embody the method patent but the profitable 
test strips did not.98 
In the situation where the profitable good is not patented, 
whether the full value of the good is received to justify patent 
exhaustion depends, ironically, on whether patent exhaustion is 
applied.  If patent exhaustion does not apply—assuming the 
patent is not being misused99—the patentee can file suit against 
the competitor for contributory infringement of its patent for 
selling the profitable good to be used with the patented good.100  
This would lead the patentee to getting the full value of the good.  
However, if patent exhaustion does apply, the original concern of 
a competitor driving down prices to their marginal costs occurs, 
preventing the full value of the patented good from being realized 
postsale.101 
There is a real consistency problem when comparing the 
history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on patent exhaustion 
with the proposed expansion by the Federal Circuit.  For goods 
distributed for free, there is no sale, purchaser, or full value 
received for the article if exhaustion is applied.  While there is a 
sale and a purchaser for goods sold for below their costs to 
produce, such a sale would not give the full value of the article if 
96 Picker, supra note 2, at 226. Professor Picker also mentions loyalty as a way 
to profit off the sale of the blades; however, the focus of this Note is limited to 
whether the value of the goods can be attained without some level of patent 
protection due to exhaustion. 
97 CHISUM, supra note 7, § OV.1 (“A patent confers the right to exclude others 
from making, using, or selling the claimed invention in the United States for a 
[specified] term . . . .”). 
98 LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
99 See infra Part III. 
100 Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 492 (“By contrast [to contracts, which are 
limited by privity], infringement actions can run against all who infringe an IP 
right, and even those who knowingly contribute to the infringements of others.”). 
101 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
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exhaustion was applied to limit posttransaction value received.  
If after applying exhaustion the requirements of the doctrine are 
not met, its application cannot be justified in these types of 
circumstances. 
B. The Expansion of Patent Exhaustion Has Likely Negative 
Effects for the Marketplace 
In addition to the inconsistencies with the history of patent 
exhaustion jurisprudence, the LifeScan decision will likely have 
unintended consequences for the market.  The Federal Circuit 
stresses that the patentee has a choice for how to secure the 
reward for his invention.102  As a result, the patentee cannot use 
the failure to gain a reward resulting from the choice to 
distribute a good for free to circumvent patent exhaustion.103  
However, in expanding exhaustion in such a way in order to 
prevent public harm by patentees asserting control over the 
purchaser’s use of the product, there is the risk of potential 
harms to both patentee and the end consumer. 
The most obvious harm by expanding patent exhaustion is to 
the patentee.  The problem is that the patentee is deprived of his 
rights in the patent monopoly of the article without receiving the 
full value of the article.104  While the Federal Circuit argues this 
is the patentee’s choice,105 there are legitimate business reasons 
to go about such transactions that can have benefits to both the 
patentee and the consumers in the market. 
To properly analyze this situation, the concept of metered 
pricing must be examined.  The metered pricing model works by 
selling an initial good or service below market price, usually at or 
below the cost to produce or provide the good or service, while a 
secondary good or service that is required to use or enhances the 
use of the original product is sold for a premium.106  The most 
commonly cited example is razors and razor blades, where the 
razors are given away or sold very cheaply in order to create a 
market for razor blades, which are required to use the razor, 
need to be periodically replaced, and are sold at a large profit 
102 LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1375. 
103 Id. 
104 See supra Part II.A. 
105 LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1375. 
106 See Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1. 
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margin.107  The costs that are incurred by distributing the razors 
so cheaply are recouped and then exceeded by subsequent sales 
of the blades.108  Modern examples using this sales model include 
printers with ink, e-book readers with e-books, video game 
consoles with games, and movie tickets with concessions.109 
This concept of metered selling has the ability to increase 
efficiency for the seller.110  Take the example of movie tickets and 
high concession prices.111  Due to the high prices, only a subset of 
consumers will purchase concessions, but each of those sales will 
be highly profitable.112  Absent these highly profitable concession 
sales, the movie theatre would likely need to raise ticket prices in 
order to maintain the same profits.113  This would cause some 
customers to be “priced out of the market,” leading to less total 
volume of customers.  By lowering the up-front cost, more total 
customers will purchase tickets, with higher profits extracted 
from the subset of customers that purchase the higher priced 
concessions.114 
By applying patent exhaustion to goods distributed for free 
or sold below cost as a per se rule, the model breaks down.  
Absent some level of patent protection, the patentee will be 
unable to prevent competition from lowering the price of the 
secondary product to the cost of production.115  This consequence 
disincentivizes the patentee from using a business model that 
can simultaneously promote efficiency by increasing the total 
universe of available customers for the seller and increasing 
access to the good for buyers116 and increase the likelihood of the 
patentee profiting from his invention. 
107 Picker, supra note 2, at 226. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.; see also Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 1046–47. 
110 Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1. 
111 Id. (using a similar scenario to explain the concept). 
112 See id. 
113 Id. 
114 See George Anders, Inside Amazon’s Idea Machine: How Bezos Decodes 
Customers, FORBES, Apr. 23, 2012, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeanders/2012/04/04/inside-amazon/ (“Amazon’s 
selling price [for the Kindle Fire tablet] of $199 [does not] appear to cover costs. 
[Founder and CEO Jeff] Bezos [is not] perturbed. . . . If it induces owners to buy 
more from Amazon, the costs of spreading these tablets globally will be well worth 
it.”). 
115 Picker, supra note 2, at 226. 
116 Gil & Hartmann, supra note 1, at 1046–47. 
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If the metered pricing model is disincentivized as a result of 
such an expansion in patent exhaustion, patentees are not the 
only group who would be harmed.  Consumers in the market 
would also face indirect harm as a result.  One of the advantages 
of metered pricing to consumers is that the initial cost of the 
initial good or service involved is lower.117  This reduced up-front 
cost has the ability to “open access of a good to customers that 
would otherwise be priced out of the market.”118 
Going back to the movie theatre example, if concessions were 
unable to be priced at a premium, in order for the theatre to 
maintain the previous profit margins the price of tickets would 
have to be increased to even higher than they are today.119  This 
increase would lead to fewer customers buying tickets for movies, 
which would in turn lead to fewer customers purchasing the 
concessions as well.120  This outcome is not beneficial for 
consumers either, as they will likely see fewer movies as a result, 
and when they do go to the movies, they will need to pay a higher 
price for their ticket. 
The same result would occur in other examples: more 
expensive printers with low priced ink, marked up e-book readers 
with cheaper e-books, and exorbitantly priced video game 
consoles with more affordable games.  This sort of result may 
benefit some high frequency users, but the average user of any of 
these products would be less likely to pay the up-front costs due 
to being priced out of the market. 
Patent exhaustion does not fit well when applied to goods 
distributed for free or sold below cost.  There are consistency 
problems with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, as well as 
unintended harms for both buyers and sellers in the 
marketplace.  At its core, patent exhaustion is the balance of 
several principles.  On one side is the promotion of invention by 
increasing the ability of an inventor to profit from his invention 
via the limited monopoly over it.121  On the other side are two 
principles.  The first is the general public interest in the free 
alienation of property.122  While reducing the burdens on innocent 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1046. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 Rinehart, supra note 23, at 490. 
122 Id. at 492. 
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purchasers is important,123 doing so at the cost of losing public 
access to the new technology due to higher prices makes it less 
so. 
In order to justify an expansion of the doctrine, it would need 
to be in furtherance of the second competing goal, reducing the 
anticompetitive effects of postsale restrictions.124  However, the 
existing doctrine of patent misuse is more closely tailored to 
fulfill this need in circumstances where a patented good is sold 
below cost with the goal of profiting from a related unpatented 
good.125  The existence of a body of law which better fits the 
circumstances raised in the Federal Circuit’s decision to expand 
patent exhaustion demonstrates how unnecessary this expansion 
is. 
III. PATENT MISUSE WILL BETTER LIMIT THE POTENTIAL 
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO APPLY PATENT 
EXHAUSTION TO GOODS SOLD BELOW COST 
In its LifeScan decision, the Federal Circuit expressed 
concerns about the potential impact on market competition 
resulting from a failure to expand patent exhaustion to goods 
distributed for free.126  Permitting LifeScan to conduct business 
in this way “would be akin to allowing a tying arrangement” that 
would prevent purchasers from using competing test strips.127  
The court cites to Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Manufacturing Co.128 to bolster its concerns.129 
While the concern that LifeScan would leverage its patent on 
the meter to gain an unfair advantage in the test strip market is 
certainly legitimate, this neither requires nor justifies an 
expansion of patent exhaustion.  Instead, this issue points 
towards an existing solution that originated in Motion Picture 
Patents Co. itself: the doctrine of patent misuse.  There are two 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See infra Part III. 
126 LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (“Rejecting a claim of exhaustion in this case would be particularly 
problematic because LifeScan would be permitted to eliminate competition in the 
sale of the strips even though the strips do not embody the claimed invention and 
are themselves not patentable.”). 
127 Id. 
128 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
129 LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1373.  
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tying concerns to address here.  The first is whether requiring a 
purchaser to use LifeScan’s unpatented test strips in order to 
purchase their blood glucose meter is patent misuse.  The second 
is whether it constitutes patent misuse for LifeScan to seek 
contributory infringement actions against competitors 
manufacturing test strips compatible with their meters. 
A. Requiring Use of Unpatented Test Strips To Purchase 
LifeScan’s Blood Glucose Meter Did Not Constitute Patent 
Misuse 
To prove that the tying of a patented good to an unpatented 
tied good constitutes patent misuse, one must demonstrate that 
the two products are indeed tied, the tied product is a staple 
good, and the patentee has market power in the market of the 
tying product.130  Using the LifeScan facts, it is apparent that a 
sales model such as LifeScan’s alone likely did not constitute 
patent misuse and, therefore, was within the “physical or 
temporal scope” of the rights granted by the patent in the 
meter.131 
First, it must be determined if the transaction between 
LifeScan and its customers constituted a tying arrangement.  
There are two alternative possibilities for details of the 
transaction, each of which would point to the existence of a tie.132  
If LifeScan had formed contracts with its customers to require 
them to purchase its test strips at the same time as receiving 
their meters, and would not give or sell the meters without also 
selling the test strips, this would fit the classic tying scenario.133  
However, even if the contract specified that purchasers could 
only use LifeScan’s test strips with the device, and did not 
require purchase at the same time, that would constitute a tie for 
130 See supra Part I.B. 
131 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971). 
132 It is worth noting that the Federal Circuit itself acknowledges that the 
situation is similar to a tying arrangement. LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1373 (“Allowing 
LifeScan to control sale of the strips would be akin to allowing a tying arrangement 
whereby the purchasers of the meters could be barred from using the meters with 
competing strips.”). 
133 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60 (“In patent cases, this classic form of tying 
involves the insistence by a patent owner that those who would license the patent 
(or purchase a product covered by the patent) must purchase a separate product not 
covered by that patent from the patentee.”). 
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purposes of patent misuse.134  In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger 
Co.,135 the Supreme Court held that requiring purchasers of a 
patented machine for depositing salt tablets into cans to 
purchase the staple salt tablets from the patentee constituted 
patent misuse.136  Therefore, even absent an express contract 
making the sale contingent on the simultaneous purchase of an 
unpatented staple good, just requiring the future purchase of 
that staple is sufficient to constitute tying in the context of 
patent misuse. 
Second, it must be determined whether the test strips 
constituted a staple good.  In the context of patent misuse, a good 
is a nonstaple good if its sole substantial use is in connection 
with the patented invention, while a good is considered a staple if 
it has commercial uses other than those related to the patent.137  
This is a fact-finding determination that was not made in the 
LifeScan decision, but one may be able to impute an answer from 
the determinations made by the court in its exhaustion analysis. 
The feature that enabled these test strips to work with the 
meter was that there were two electrodes instead of one, and one 
was downstream of the other, which would enable better 
determinations of errors in detecting blood glucose levels.138  
During the course of prosecution of the original patent with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the concept 
of a biosensor containing multiple electrodes was determined to 
be disclosed in the prior art.139  This prior art disclosure caused 
the patent examiner to reject the claims on the test strips 
themselves, although the method patent for the process of 
examining blood glucose was allowed.140  The Federal Circuit 
asserted, in its exhaustion analysis, that “[t]he fact that the prior 
art strips might have required some reconfiguration to use with 
LifeScan’s meters is irrelevant.”141 
134 See id. (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)). 
135 314 U.S. 488. 
136 Id. at 491. This decision predates the addition of the market power 
requirement to find such a tie. 
137 VAKERICS, supra note 57. 
138 LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1369–70. 
141 Id. at 1373. 
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While the level of modification the prior art would need to 
undergo to be compatible with LifeScan’s meter was not relevant 
to the Federal Circuit’s decision, it is highly relevant in 
determining if Shasta’s strips constituted a staple good.  The 
existence of test strips with multiple electrodes in the prior art 
increases the likelihood that a court would find Shasta’s strips as 
staple goods, but the analysis does not end there.  In the entire 
existing market for test strips, only some portion of them have 
the multiple working electrodes required by the LifeScan 
meter.142  Even then, these multiple electrode test strips lacked 
the proper layout to be compatible with LifeScan’s meter.143  With 
this being the case, a court could find that the test strips 
produced by Shasta lacked “substantial non-infringing uses.”144  
Shasta’s strips could be considered a nonstaple good as they were 
designed to work specifically with LifeScan’s meters, which 
suggests that the strips lack any noninfringing use.145 
Prior to the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988, the analysis 
would have ended there with a determination of whether there 
was per se misuse or not.146  However, Congress explicitly limited 
the original common law rule to add the additional element of 
market power in the tying good as a requirement to finding 
patent misuse; therefore, an additional inquiry must be made to 
complete the analysis.147 
It is important to note that market power in this case is not 
defined as monopolistic power, which would be the gathering of a 
large amount of market power.148  Instead, market power exists 
when a firm has the power to charge more than the marginal 
costs by reducing output in such a way that the rest of the 
market would be unable to replace.149 
 
 
 
142 See id. at 1363–64. 
143 See id. at 1373 (suggesting that existing prior art strips with multiple 
electrodes would require reconfiguration to be used with LifeScan’s meter). 
144 VAKERICS, supra note 57. 
145 LifeScan, 734 F.3d at 1365. 
146 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. § 4.1. 
149 Id. 
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According to market research in 2008, LifeScan was one of 
four competitors who, combined, controlled 89.7% of the market 
in self-testing blood glucose meters.150  It is not necessary that 
LifeScan possess the majority of market share, or even the 
largest piece of market share to be said to have market power.  
Instead, the test is whether its output reduction would reduce 
market-wide output in such a way that rivals would not be able 
to quickly replace the lost volume.151  While it is possible that the 
competitors in the market would be able to replace 
approximately a quarter of the total market with increased 
production, it is unlikely that one would consider this an 
“inconsequential” impact on the market price.152  Also, since 
LifeScan does own the patent to its improvement on the meter, 
one can impute some amount of market power from this as 
well.153  However, it is important to note that any finding of 
market power may not solely be the result of the existence of the 
patent.154  Given both the ability to manipulate prices and the 
existence of the patent, it is likely that LifeScan would be 
determined to have market power. 
Under this analysis, LifeScan’s requiring use of the 
unpatented test strips in order to receive the glucose meter 
embodying their method patent would not constitute patent 
misuse because the test strips did not constitute a staple good.  
The remaining question is whether an attempt by LifeScan to 
prevent the sale of this nonstaple product constitutes patent 
misuse. 
B. Preventing Competitors from Selling Compatible Test Strips 
Likely Constitutes Patent Misuse 
In earlier versions of the patent misuse doctrine, the 
Supreme Court held that a patentee could misuse his patent by 
attempting to control the sale of component products used in a 
patented invention even if they were nonstaple products.155  This 
150 Mark D. Hughes, The Business of Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose: A Market 
Profile, 3 J. DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 1219, 1221 (2009). LifeScan is the second in the 
market with 27.2% market share, with the market leader controlling 30.8%. Id. 
151 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 4.1. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. § 3.2. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. § 3.3a2 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)). 
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would cause a situation like the one in LifeScan to fall firmly  
within patent misuse; just the act of suing Shasta for 
contributory infringement would remove liability from Shasta for 
the act of contributory infringement itself. 
Congress restricted the doctrine by passing the 1952 Patent 
Act, which included changes reversing these decisions156 by 
setting the edge of the patent misuse doctrine to where 
contributory infringement began.157  This amendment added two 
sections to the statute.  First, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) defined 
contributory infringement as producing or selling components of 
patented devices or methods.158  To be liable as a contributory 
infringer, the part being sold cannot be “a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing 
use.”159  Second, the amendment added, in relevant part: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right 
by reason of his having done one or more of the following:  
(1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another 
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement 
of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts 
which if performed without his consent would constitute 
contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce 
his patent rights against infringement or contributory 
infringement . . . .160 
One example of an application of the new amendment to a 
case dealing with contributory infringement is Dawson Chemical 
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.161  There, the Supreme Court heard a 
case dealing with the unpatented chemical, propanil.162  This 
chemical, although known for some time, did not constitute a 
staple good because it had no use other than practicing the  
 
 
 
156 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1)–(3) (2012). 
157 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2. 
158 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. § 271(d)(1)–(3). 
161 448 U.S. 176 (1980). 
162 Id. at 185. 
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plaintiff’s patented method of use as an herbicide.163  The Court 
held that under the statute, excluding defendants from selling 
the nonstaple good did not constitute misuse.164 
Under Dawson Chemical, attempts by LifeScan to prevent 
Shasta from producing compatible test strips would appear to not 
constitute patent misuse.  Test strips compatible with LifeScan’s 
meter would likely not constitute staple goods because there 
would be no noninfringing use of a test strip specifically designed 
to work only with LifeScan’s meters, which embody its patented 
method of blood glucose monitoring.165  Similar to the herbicide 
propanil, the only use for the Shasta strips was in connection 
with LifeScan’s patent.  Therefore, in a vacuum, a court might 
find that LifeScan did not misuse its patent here. 
However, Shasta’s best argument is the prosecution history 
of LifeScan’s patent.  LifeScan sought a device patent on the test 
strips themselves, but was denied due to disclosures in the prior 
art.166  By attempting to use the method patent to prevent others 
from manufacturing competing test strips, LifeScan is 
attempting to broaden their patent to cover the unpatentable 
strips as well.  This attempt to expand the scope of the method 
patent to cover unpatentable devices would likely be found to 
have “impermissibly broadened” the patent right in a way that 
misuse doctrine seeks to prevent, barring LifeScan from 
recovery.167 
One final consideration is whether filing a contributory 
infringement action in and of itself would constitute patent 
misuse in these circumstances.  The Supreme Court cases before 
the 1952 Patent Act held that this action did constitute misuse.168  
This amendment to the statute added, in relevant part: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or 
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or 
deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right 
163 Id. at 185–86. 
164 Id. at 223. 
165 See supra Part III.A. 
166 LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
167 Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)). 
168 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell 
Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)). 
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by reason of his having done one or more of the 
following: . . . (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against 
infringement or contributory infringement . . . .169 
This amendment prevents any finding of patent misuse for the 
sole reason of a patentee attempting to vindicate his rights 
against an infringer or contributory infringer.170  Therefore, 
under this new framework, LifeScan would not be found to be 
misusing its patent by filing a contributory infringement suit 
against Shasta for producing compatible test strips for its blood 
glucose meters. 
In sum, LifeScan would likely be found to have misused the 
patent on its blood glucose meter.  While Shasta’s actions in 
specifically designing their competing test strips to work 
specifically with LifeScan’s meter is probative, LifeScan 
attempting to use their method patent to get around the PTO’s 
decision to reject their device claim for the strips is more so.  
Under these facts, LifeScan “impermissibly broadened the 
‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect.”171  Despite the outcome being the same, 
applying patent misuse provides a more fine-tuned analysis of 
potential anticompetitive issues.  This is especially true in 
situations where patented goods sold for below cost are tied 
together with higher profit unpatented goods, rather than the 
LifeScan court’s adoption of a per se rule expanding patent 
exhaustion. 
IV. CASE STUDY: EXAMINING THE PROBLEMS OF EXPANDING 
PATENT EXHAUSTION 
The LifeScan decision might be considered a situation where 
easy cases make bad law.  After all, the court could have instead 
relied on Lifescan’s attempt to expand its method patent to cover 
a device which the PTO decided was not patentable to reach the 
same result.  However, to put the potential ramifications of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision into sharper focus, a hypothetical 
scenario raising these concerns is warranted. 
 
169 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3) (2012). 
170 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 60, § 3.3a2. 
171 Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971)). 
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A group of recent Ph.D. graduates in the fields of computer 
science, physics, and engineering worked together as part of their 
doctoral thesis.  Together, they invented a novel approach to 
optical media far superior to currently available CD, DVD, and 
Blu-Ray technology.  CD and DVD players utilize a red laser to 
read information off of the disc as it spins, while Blu-Ray readers 
can use a more efficient blue laser to read all three forms of 
media.172  This group has invented a process for using ultraviolet 
lasers to play all three formats, as well as a new format called 
UVD.  This new process enables older formats to be read faster 
than with red or blue lasers, as well as allowing the use of the 
new UVDs, which only works with ultraviolet readers and can 
store vastly greater amounts of data, while still maintaining 
faster speeds than any existing optical format. 
The group obtains a method patent for the process of reading 
all four formats using ultraviolet lasers, with such a use not 
being disclosed in the prior art.  The scientists form a company, 
UV Inc., for the sole purpose of manufacturing and selling both 
UVD players as well as UVDs.  They find that the components 
needed to produce their players and discs are roughly equivalent 
in price to those required to make modern Blu-Ray players.  In 
order to break into the firmly established Blu-Ray market, UV 
Inc. decides to sell their players for significantly below cost.  
Their goal is to establish themselves as a simultaneously cheaper 
and superior alternative to the older formats in order to recoup 
their short-term losses in the UVD market, which are priced well 
above costs similarly to Blu-Ray discs.  UV Inc. also includes a 
term in its license agreement that the purchaser of a UVD player 
cannot play UVDs that were not produced by UV Inc. or one of its 
licensees with the player.  If a third party came into the market 
for UVDs, would UV Inc. be unable to hold them liable for 
contributory infringement of its method patent after the LifeScan 
decision? 
To answer this question, it must be determined if the sale of 
the UVD player would exhaust UV Inc.’s patent rights.  In 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,173 the Supreme Court 
held that for a method patent to be exhausted by the sale of a 
good, the good must be “capable of use only in practicing the 
172 Elizabeth Armstrong, DVD Lasers: Why Blue Beats Red, WIRED (June 1, 
2002, 12:00 PM), http://wired.com/2002/06/dvd-lasers-why-blue-beats-red. 
173 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
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patent” and must have “embodie[d] essential features of [the]  
patented invention.”174  Here, the UVD by its design can only be 
read by a device utilizing an ultraviolet laser, for which UV Inc. 
has a patent. 
The Court also held that a device substantially embodies the 
essential features of a method patent when “the only step 
necessary to practice the patent is the application of common 
processes or the addition of standard parts.”175  Here, the patent 
is practiced with the addition of any existing optical format, 
including standard CDs, DVDs, and Blu-Ray discs.  Since, under 
LifeScan, the sale requirement is fulfilled via the transfer of title 
instead of a sale for the full value of the good,176 the sale of the 
UVD player would be considered an exhaustive transaction. 
Since the transfer of title in the player is exhaustive, a  
third-party producer of UVDs would not be liable as a 
contributory infringer even though the actions of UV Inc. did not 
constitute patent misuse.  Two of the elements required to 
constitute patent misuse are missing: the tied good being a staple 
good and market power.177  The functionally tied UVDs would not 
constitute a staple good because they have no substantial use 
except in connection with UV Inc.’s patented process for reading 
them.178  Also, under the circumstances described above, UV Inc. 
lacks market power, as they are a new startup company.  All of 
this points to there being no anticompetitive problem with the 
hypothetical situation above, but it is still blocked by the newly 
expanded patent exhaustion doctrine. 
Public policy would seem to favor not applying exhaustion in 
this case.  If the third-party competitor were allowed to enter the 
market without fear of contributory infringement, the price of the 
UVD discs would be reduced to their marginal costs.179  This 
would have negative impacts on both buyers who would have to 
pay substantially more for the device in order to get slightly 
cheaper media, as well as UV Inc. who would be unable to both 
build a customer base while also recouping on their 
174 Id. at 631–32 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Univis Lens 
Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249–51 (1942)). 
175 Id. at 633. 
176 LifeScan Scot., Ltd. v. Shasta Techs., LLC, 734 F.3d 1361, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
177 See infra Part I.B. 
178 VAKERICS, supra note 57, § 11.02[6]. 
179 Katz, supra note 90. 
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investment.180  This is not a result of a misuse of the patent or an 
attempt to claw back on claims rejected by the PTO like in 
LifeScan.  The only result here is that a third party who did not 
put in the monetary and human capital to develop a new 
beneficial process is able to profit off of the efforts of others to the 
detriment of the inventors and the portion of the public who 
would be priced out of the market.  These are but some the 
potential unintended consequences of using the ax of an 
expanding patent exhaustion doctrine rather than the scalpel of 
patent misuse. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent exhaustion has a long and rich history in the common 
law, dating back over 150 years.  The expansion of the rule 
advocated by the Federal Circuit is concerning because it does 
not appear to be consistent with that long and storied history.  
By broadening the concept of sales to purchasers for full value to 
any transfer of title, the court does not sufficiently maintain the 
balance between public interest in the free alienation of property 
and the fundamental goals of patent law.  It could also end up 
harming consumers in the marketplace for such goods by causing 
patentees to abandon metered pricing and instead charge full 
value at the offset for their patented goods, which can price some 
consumers out of the market for these goods.  Finally, any 
concerns about expansion of the patent monopoly by failing to 
expand the patent exhaustion doctrine are better resolved via the 
existing doctrine of patent misuse.  This is true both with regards 
to tying arrangements in sales to consumers and seeking to 
exclude contributory infringers from entering the market of 
nonstaple goods.  If such an expansion of patent exhaustion is 
indeed necessary, such a move should come from the Supreme 
Court overturning its own prior precedent, not the Federal 
Circuit on its own. 
 
180 See infra Part II.B. 
